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IMPRIMITIVE PERMUTATIONS GROUPS
GENERATED BY THE ROUND FUNCTIONS OF
KEY-ALTERNATING BLOCK CIPHERS AND
TRUNCATED DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS
A. CARANTI, F. DALLA VOLTA, M. SALA, AND FRANCESCA VILLANI
Abstract. We answer a question of Paterson, showing that all block systems
for the group generated by the round functions of a key-alternating block cipher
are the translates of a linear subspace. Following up remarks of Paterson and
Shamir, we exhibit a connection to truncated differential cryptanalysis.
We also give a condition that guarantees that the group generated by the
round functions of a key-alternating block cipher is primitive. This applies in
particular to AES.
1. Introduction
Kenneth Paterson [12] has considered iterated block ciphers in which the group
generated by the one-round functions acts imprimitively on the message space,
with the aim of exploring the possibility that this might lead to the design of
trapdoors. The blocks of imprimitivity he uses are the translates (cosets) of a
linear subspace. He asked whether it is possible to construct other, non-linear
blocks of imprimitivity.
In the first part of this paper we answer this question in the negative for key-
alternating block ciphers, and exhibit a connection to truncated differential crypt-
analysis, following up remarks of Paterson and Shamir.
We then develop a conceptual recipe to guarantee that the group generated by
the one-round functions of a key-alternating block cipher acts primitively on the
message space. We show that the conditions we require are satisfied in a natural
way by AES.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to P. Fitzpatrick and C. Traverso for their
useful comments. Part of this work has been presented at the Workshop on Coding
and Cryptography which was held at BCRI, UC Cork in 2005.
Date: 12 June 2006 — Version 5.01.
Key words and phrases. AES, Rijndael, key-alternating block ciphers, truncated differential
cryptanalysis, primitive groups, imprimitive groups, block systems.
Caranti and Dalla Volta are members of INdAM-GNSAGA, Italy. Caranti has been partially
supported by MIUR-Italy via PRIN 2001012275 “Graded Lie algebras and pro-p-groups of finite
width, loop algebras, and derivations”. Dalla Volta has been partially supported by MIUR-Italy
via PRIN “Group theory and applications”. Sala has been partially supported by STMicroelec-
tronics contract “Complexity issues in algebraic Coding Theory and Cryptography”.
2 A. CARANTI, F. DALLA VOLTA, M. SALA, AND FRANCESCA VILLANI
2. Preliminaries
Let G be a finite group, acting transitively on a set V . We write the action
of an element g ∈ G on an element α ∈ V on the right, that is, as αg. Also,
αG = {αg : g ∈ G } is the orbit of α under G, and Gα = { g ∈ G : αg = α } is the
stabilizer of α in G.
A partition of V is a family B of nonempty subsets of V such that any element
of V lies in precisely one element of B. A partition B is said to be G-invariant if
for any B ∈ B and g ∈ G, one has Bg ∈ B. A G-invariant partition B is said to
be trivial if B = { V }, or B = { {α } : α ∈ V }.
A non-trivial, G-invariant partition of V is said to be a block system for the
action of G on V . If such a block system exists, then we say that G is imprimitive
in its action on V (equivalently, G acts imprimitively on V ), primitive otherwise.
An element B of some block system B is called a block ; since G acts transitively
on V , we have then B = {Bg : g ∈ G }.
We note the following elementary
Lemma 2.1 ([1], Theorem 1.7). Let G be a finite group, acting transitively on a
set V . Let α ∈ V .
Then the blocks B containing α are in one-to-one correspondence with the sub-
groups H, with Gα < H < G. The correspondence is given by B = αH.
In particular, G is primitive if and only if Gα is a maximal subgroup of G.
We will need a fact from the basic theory of finite fields. (See for instance [6] or
[8].) Write GF(pn) for the finite field with pn elements, p a prime.
Lemma 2.2. GF(pn) ⊆ GF(pm) if and only if n divides m.
In the rest of the paper, we tend to adopt the notation of [2].
Let V = V (nb, 2), the vector space of dimension nb over the field GF(2) with
two elements, be the state space. V has 2nb elements.
For any v ∈ V , consider the translation by v, that is the map
σv : V → V,
w 7→ w + v.
In particular, σ0 is the identity map on V . The set
T = {σv : v ∈ V }
is an elementary abelian, regular subgroup of Sym(V ). In fact, the map
(2.1)
V → T
v 7→ σv
is an isomorphism of the additive group V onto the multiplicative group T .
We consider a key-alternating block cipher (see Section 2.4.2 of [2]) which con-
sists of a number of iterations of a round function of the form ρσk. (Recall that
we write maps left-to-right, so ρ operates first.) Here ρ is a fixed permutation
operating on the vector space V = V (nb, 2), and k ∈ V is a round key. (According
to the more general definition of [2], ρ might depend on the round.) Therefore
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each round consists of an application of ρ, followed by a key addition. This covers
for instance AES with independent subkeys. Let G = 〈 ρσk : k ∈ V 〉 the group of
permutations of V generated by the round functions. Choosing k = 0 we see that
ρ ∈ G, and thus T ≤ G. It follows that G = 〈 T, ρ 〉.
3. Imprimitivity
Kenneth Paterson [12] has considered iterated block ciphers in which the group
generated by the one-round functions acts imprimitively on the message space,
with the aim of exploring the possibility that this might lead to the design of
trapdoors. The blocks of imprimitivity he uses are the translates (cosets) of a
linear subspace. He asked whether it is possible to construct other, non-linear
blocks of imprimitivity:
Can “undetectable” trapdoors based on more complex systems of
imprimitivity be inserted in otherwise conventional ciphers? It is
easily shown that, in a DES-like cipher, any [block] system based
on a linear sub-space and its cosets leads to a noticeable regularity
in the XOR tables of small S-boxes. It seems that we must look be-
yond the “linear” systems considered here, or consider other types
of round function.
In a personal communication [13], Paterson remarks further
At the FSE conference where it was presented, Adi Shamir told
me that he could break the scheme using a truncated differential
attack [. . . ]
Truncated differential cryptanalysis has been introduced in [7] by L. R. Knudsen;
see also the approach in [14].
In this section we answer Paterson’s question for the key-alternating block ci-
phers described above, by showing
Theorem 3.1. Let G be the group generated by the round functions of a key-
alternating block cipher. Suppose G acts imprimitively on the message space. Then
the blocks of imprimitivity are the translates of a linear subspace.
Proof. In the notation above, suppose G acts imprimitively on V .
If G has a nontrivial block system, this is also a block system for T . So if B is
a block system for G, and B ∈ B is the block containing 0, because of Lemma 2.1
we have B = 0H , for some 1 < H < T . Because of the isomorphism (2.1), we
have
H = {σu : u ∈ U } ,
for a suitable subspace U of V , with U 6= { 0 } , V . Since T = { σv : v ∈ V } is
abelian, we have
B = {Bσv : v ∈ V } = { 0Hσv : v ∈ V } = { 0σvH : v ∈ V } =
= { vH : v ∈ V } = { v + U : v ∈ V } .
This completes the proof of the first implication. The converse is immediate. 
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4. Truncated differential cryptanalysis
We now develop a relation to truncated differential cryptanalysis, elaborating
on Shamir’s comment.
Suppose G acts imprimitively on the message space V , and use the notation of
the proof of Theorem 3.1. Let v ∈ V . Now vHρ is the block containing v·1·ρ = vρ,
so that
vHρ = vρH,
for all v. This means that for all v ∈ V and u ∈ U there is u′ ∈ U such that
vσuρ = (v + u)ρ = vρ+ u
′ = vρσu′.
In other words we have the following connection to truncated differential crypt-
analysis.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose G acts imprimitively on the message space V .
Then there is a subspace U 6= { 0 } , V such that if v, v+u ∈ V are two messages
whose difference u lies in the subspace U , then the output difference also lies in U .
In other words, if v ∈ V and u ∈ U , then
(4.1) (v + u)ρ+ vρ ∈ U.
Conversely, if the last condition holds, then G acts imprimitively on V .
To our understanding, a subspace U as in Corollary 4.1 could indeed be used as
a trapdoor as in Paterson’s scheme, and still be difficult to detect. This is most
clear when U is chosen to have dimension half of that of V . To a cryptanalyst who
knows U , the complexity of a brute force search is reduced from |V | to 2
√
|V |.
However, the number of subspaces of a given dimension m of a finite vector space
of (even) dimension n over GF(2) is largest for m = n/2, and is O(2m
2
). If U is
not just given by the vanishing of some of the defining bits, it appears to us that
it might be hard to find. Because of this, in the next section we approach the
problem of proving in a conceptual way that such a U does not exists for a given
key-iterated block cipher.
5. Ensuring primitivity
Ralph Wernsdorf has proved in [15] that the group G generated by the round
functions of AES with independent subkeys is the alternating group Alt(n). Thus
G is definitely primitive on V .
In the following we review this consequence of Wernsdorf’s result from a con-
ceptual point of view. This comes in the form of a recipe for the group generated
by the round functions of a key-alternating block cipher to be primitive. We will
show that this recipe is satisfied by AES in a rather natural way.
We begin with making the description of a key-alternating block cipher we gave
in Section 2 more precise. (Again, we are staying close to the notation of [2].)
We assume ρ = γλ, where γ and λ are permutations. Here γ is a bricklayer
transformation, consisting of a number of S-boxes. The message space V is written
as a direct sum
V = V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vnt,
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where each Vi has the same dimension m over GF(2). For v ∈ V , we will write
v = v1 + · · ·+ vnt , where vi ∈ Vi. Also, we consider the projections pii : V → Vi,
which map v 7→ vi. We have
vγ = v1γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vntγnt ,
where the γi are S-boxes, which we allow to be different for each Vi.
λ is a linear mixing layer.
In AES the S-boxes are all equal, and consist of inversion in the field GF(28)
with 28 elements (see later in this paragraph), followed by an affine transformation.
The latter map thus consists of a linear transformation, followed by a translation.
When interpreting AES in our scheme, we take advantage of the well-known pos-
sibility of moving the linear part of the affine transformation to the linear mixing
layer, and incorporating the translation in the key addition (see for instance [10]).
Thus in our scheme for AES we have m = 8, we identify each Vi with GF(2
8),
and we take xγi = x
28−2, so that γi maps nonzero elements to their inverses, and
zero to zero. As usual, we abuse notation and write xγi = x
−1. Note, however,
that with this convention xx−1 = 1 only for x 6= 0.
Our result, for a key-alternating block cipher as described earlier in this section,
is the following.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the following hold:
(1) 0γ = 0 and γ2 = 1, the identity transformation.
(2) There is 1 ≤ r < m/2 such that for all i
• for all 0 6= v ∈ Vi, the image of the map Vi → Vi, which maps x 7→
(x+ v)γi + xγi, has size greater than 2
m−r−1, and
• there is no subspace of Vi, invariant under γi, of codimension less than
or equal to 2r.
(3) No sum of some of the Vi (except { 0 } and V ) is invariant under λ.
Then G is primitive.
We note immediately
Lemma 5.2. AES satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.3. The group generated by the round functions of AES with indepen-
dent subkeys is primitive.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Condition (1) is clearly satisfied.
So is (3), by the construction of the mixing layer. In fact, suppose U 6= { 0 } is
a subspace of V which is invariant under λ. Suppose, without loss of generality,
that U ⊇ V1. Because of MixColumns [2, 3.4.3], U contains the whole first column
of the state. Now the action of ShiftRows [2, 3.4.2] and MixColumns on the first
column shows that U contains four whole columns, and considering (if the state
has more than four columns) once more the action of ShiftRows and MixColumns
one sees that U = V .
The first part of Condition (2) is also well-known to be satisfied, with r = 1
(see [11] but also [3]). We recall the short proof for convenience. For a 6= 0, the
6 A. CARANTI, F. DALLA VOLTA, M. SALA, AND FRANCESCA VILLANI
map GF(28)→ GF(28), which maps x 7→ (x+a)−1+x−1, has image of size 27−1.
In fact, if b 6= a−1, the equation
(5.1) (x+ a)−1 + x−1 = b
has at most two solutions. Clearly x = 0, a are not solutions, so we can multiply
by x(x+ a) obtaining the equation
(5.2) x2 + ax+ ab−1 = 0,
which has at most two solutions. If b = a−1, equation (5.1) has four solutions.
Two of them are x = 0, a. Two more come from (5.2), which becomes
x2 + ax+ a2 = a2 ·
(
(x/a)2 + x/a + 1
)
= 0.
By Lemma 2.2, GF(28) contains GF(4) = { 0, 1, c, c2 }, where c, c2 are the roots of
y2+y+1 = 0, Thus when b = a−1 equation (5.1) has the four solutions 0, a, ac, ac2.
It follows that the image of the map x 7→ (x+ a)−1 + x−1 has size
28 − 4
2
+
4
4
= 27 − 1,
as claimed.
As to the second part of Condition (2), one could just use GAP [4] to verify that
the only nonzero subspaces of GF(28) which are invariant under inversion are
the subfields. According to Lemma 2.2, the largest proper one is thus GF(24), of
codimension 4 > 2 = 2r. However, this follows from the more general Theorem 6.1,
which we give in the Appendix. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that G is imprimitive.
According to Corollary 4.1, there is a subspace U 6= { 0 } , V of V such that if
v, v + u ∈ V are two messages whose difference u lies in the subspace U , then the
output difference also lies in U , that is
(v + u)ρ+ vρ ∈ U.
Since λ is linear, we have
Fact 1. For all u ∈ U and v ∈ V we have
(5.3) (v + u)γ + vγ ∈ Uλ−1 = W,
where W is also a linear subspace of V , with dim(W ) = dim(U).
Setting v = 0 in (5.3), and because of Condition (1), we obtain
Fact 2. Uγ =W and Wγ = U .
Now if U 6= { 0 }, we will have Upii 6= { 0 } for some i. We prove some increas-
ingly stronger facts under this hypothesis.
Fact 3. Suppose Upii 6= { 0 } for some i. Then W ∩ Vi 6= { 0 }.
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Let u ∈ U , with ui 6= 0. Take any 0 6= vi ∈ Vi. Then (u+ vi)γ + viγ ∈ W , and
also uγ ∈ W , by Fact 2. It follows that uγ+(u+vi)γ+viγ ∈ W . The latter vector
has all nonzero components but for the one in Vi, which is uiγi+(ui+vi)γi+viγi ∈
W∩Vi. If the latter vector is zero for all vi ∈ Vi, then the image of the map Vi → Vi,
which maps vi 7→ (vi + ui)γi + viγi, is {uiγi }, of size 1. This contradicts the first
part of Condition (2).
Clearly (W ∩ Vi)γ = U ∩ Vi. It follows
Fact 4. Suppose Upii 6= { 0 } for some i. Then U ∩ Vi 6= { 0 }.
Finally we obtain
Fact 5. Suppose Upii 6= { 0 } for some i. Then U ⊇ Vi.
According to Fact 4, there is 0 6= ui ∈ U ∩Vi. By the first part of Condition (2)
the map Vi → Vi, which maps x 7→ (x+ ui)γi + xγi, has image of size > 2
m−r−1.
Since this image is contained in the linear subspace W ∩ Vi, it follows that the
latter has size at least 2m−r, that is, codimension at most r in Vi. The same holds
for U ∩ Vi = (W ∩ Vi)γ. Thus the linear subspace U ∩W ∩ Vi has codimension at
most 2r in Vi. In particular, it is different from { 0 }, as m > 2r. From Fact 2 it
follows that U ∩W ∩ Vi is invariant under γ. By the second part of Condition (2)
we have U ∩W ∩ Vi = Vi, so that U ⊇ Vi as claimed.
From Fact 5 we obtain immediately
Fact 6. U is a direct sum of some of the Vi, and W = U
The second part follows from the fact that W = Uγ, and Viγ = Vi for all i.
Since U = Wλ by (5.3), we obtain U = Uλ, with U 6= { 0 } , V . This contradicts
Condition (3), and completes the proof. 
The proof of Theorem 5.1 can be adapted to prove a slightly more general
statement, in which Conditions (1) and (2) are replaced with
(1′) 0γ = 0 and γs = 1, for some s > 1.
(2′) There is 1 ≤ r < m/s such that for all i
• for all 0 6= v ∈ Vi, the image of the map Vi → Vi, which maps
x 7→ (x+ v)γi + xγi, has size greater than 2
m−r−1, and
• there is no proper subspace of Vi, invariant under γi, of codimension
less than or equal to sr.
6. Appendix
We are grateful to Sandro Mattarei (see [9], and also [5], for more general results)
for the following
Theorem 6.1. Let F be a field of characteristic two. Suppose U 6= 0 is an additive
subgroup of F which contains the inverses of each of its nonzero elements. Then
U is a subfield of F .
Proof. Hua’s identity, valid in any associative (but not necessarily commutative)
ring A, shows
(6.1) a+ ((a− b−1)−1 − a−1)−1 = aba
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for a, b ∈ A, with a, b, ab− 1 invertible.
First of all, 1 ∈ U . This is because U has even order, and each element different
from 0, 1 is distinct from its inverse.
Now (6.1) for b = 1, and a ∈ U \{ 0, 1 } shows that for a ∈ U , also a2 ∈ U . (This
is clearly valid also for a = 0, 1.) It follows that any c ∈ U can be represented in
the form c = a2 for some a ∈ U . Now (6.1) shows that U is closed under products,
so that U is a subring, and thus a subfield, of F . 
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